

## **BOOK REVIEWS**

**Arrigo Amadori, 2013, *Negociando la Obediencia: Gestión y Reforma de los Virreinos Americanos en Tiempos del Conde-Duque de Olivares (1621–1643)*, Madrid, Spain: CSIC-Universidad de Sevilla-Diputación Provincial de Sevilla.**

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Arrigo Amadori's *Negociando la Obediencia* analyzes the role the Spanish Americas had in the count-duke of Olivares' program for reinvigoration and reform of the Hispanic monarchy. Olivares' period as king Felipe IV's favorite or *valido* (1621–1643) has been the subject of defining monographs such as J.H. Elliott's 1984 and 1986 works. Olivares' approach to the Americas remained understudied partly due to the misleading effect of the count-duke's words of contempt toward the New World (17, 459). A decline in the remittances of Spanish-American bullion to Castile in the seventeenth century only galvanized scholars in the certainty that the Indies were benignly neglected during this period (255). Unpersuaded by these assessments, the author sets out to study what were the attitudes toward the governance of the Spanish Americas during Olivares' *validimienta*. Amadori does so by using a variety of sources among which the recommendations (*consultas*) elevated by the Council of the Indies for the king's determination are the most prominent corpus. The author also analyzes the composition of the Council of the Indies in the age of Olivares as a means to understand the reach of the *valido*'s influence on the body dictating most of the Spanish policy toward the Americas. Similarly, he seeks to reconstruct the ties of men in important positions—such as the viceroys of Peru and New Spain—with the courtly milieus hegemonized by Olivares.

Amadori claims that Olivares' interest in Spanish-American policy was not a consequence of the *valido's* positive impression of the Spaniards' overseas enterprise. Rather, the author argues, Olivares envisioned the Spanish Indies as offering a double bounty. Levying new taxes or increasing existing ones in the Americas could lead to the expansion of Castile's decimated tax base at a time of mounting defense expenditure. The count-duke also exploited the Indies as a source of offices (*oficios*) and other *mercedes* (grants) with which to reward his loyalists. In Amadori's narrative, patronage emerges as a means to make ends meet. The count-duke relied on patronage to achieve "active obedience" for his designs of increased taxation to fund the Hispanic Hapsburgs' wars in Europe (28). As offices multiplied, and the *valido's validos* became patrons, the program of active obedience and the empowerment of the Planet King—as Olivares called Felipe IV—diluted. The *olivarista* program thus became increasingly conditioned by the *valido's* network, facing a minefield of negotiations that marked every step of Madrid's policy toward the Americas. Historians had focused on the compromises reached between Hapsburg monarchs and the territorial parliaments of the Monarchy—such as the Castilian Cortes—in order to secure funds for the Crown (Jago 1981; Thompson 1982, 1984, 1990, 1994, 1997). Studies focusing on the Americas traditionally paid attention to dynamics of local resistance to Madrid's mandates (Phelan: 1967, 1978), and more recently to of intra-imperial monetary redistribution (Marichal and von Grafenstein, 2012; Grafe and Irigoien 2008, 2011). Amadori's distinctive contribution is to procure a simultaneous outlook at both sides of the Atlantic situating the displays of reluctance to the implementation of parts of the *olivarista* program in the Americas into wider patterns of negotiation.

Olivares had to act within defined contours of political institutions and mental dispositions. Amadori explores these constraints in the first chapter, laying out the importance of notions concerning the government by council in the Hispanic political imagination. Government by council meant that the monarch did not govern isolated but benefited from the advice of ministers

assembled in territorial councils of the Hispanic monarchy. Conversely, the idea of *valimiento* opposed this multi-personal deliberative process. A *valido* hegemonized life in the court and monopolized the monarch's ear. As such, Olivares faced staunch criticism from the defenders of the councils. Amadori argues that the count-duke could not undo these foundations of Hispanic institutional architecture and political imagination. A first indicator of the place that the government by council had in the *olviarista* program was the fact that most of the Council of the Indies' recommendations to the king during the count-duke's *valimiento* concerned *oficios* and *mercedes* in the Americas (71–76). As distributing positions and grants were fundamental vehicles of patronage, the *valido* sought to hijack the Council with men of his own. Amadori explores then, in Chapter 2, how the count-duke made the body permeable to his influence. Olivares appointed men of his trust in relevant positions within the Council (108–116), and, significantly, reinstated the position of Great Chancellor of the Indies—an office that he took and served via surrogates (112).

Apart from designing a take-over of the Council by loyal personnel, the count-duke gave it new ordinances and also sought to circumvent the body by creating new positions. These included the *Secretaría del Despacho* (102–103), and an array of *ad hoc* juntas, which convened for specific matters. Nevertheless, Amadori notes that, rather than operating in watertight compartments, juntas and councils shared a “common space of administration” (118–119). The same individuals simultaneously acted as councilors and junta members; some of them additionally held individual positions of import—such as appointments as viceroys. These placements also frequently fell under the *valido*'s network of patronage. Olivares showed prodigality in allocating *mercedes americanas* to the members of his courtly circles (193–195), to the people who collaborated with his program in Spain (208–209), and to those he perceived as capable administrators (171). Patronage, while devised as a means to secure the implementation of the program of a major fiscal overhaul, became itself a potential source of revenue for a

financially constrained monarchy. “It is to be noticed,” Amadori argues, “a forced contradiction in terms between the relevance allocated by Olivares in patronage as a central element in the exercise of his power, and the specific practice washed off by the importance of money” (186).

In addition, a certain *habitus* of the time suggested that subjects expected to be rewarded in exchange for their fealty to the Crown. People serving in Spanish American institutions expected Madrid to show liberality as compensation for their displays of loyalty. It was, as Amadori notes, the price to be paid for “governability” (446). “Covert negotiation” implied that peoples in the “peripheries” felt empowered by their “*servicios*” to the Crown and thus imposed conditions upon the Madrid’s mandates (203, 246–247). In Chapters 4 and 5, the author displays two specific cases by which he shows how people in the Indies conditioned flagship policies of the *olivarista* program. In Chapter 4, the author explores the case of count Chinchón and the implementation of the Unión de Armas tax package in Peru (259). Chinchón was a man who embodied much of the *olivarista* program in terms of the policies he had to implement as an administrator and his career in the service of the monarchy. Named viceroy of Peru, Chinchón was commissioned to implement the Unión de Armas taxes that would increase several trade-related levies in the district of his jurisdiction. Soon enough after his arrival, the new viceroy realized the resistance with which the tax increases would be met. While ideally the tax increase would have been implemented at the time of the war with France over the Mantuan succession in the early 1630s, the hikes only materialized by the end of the decade (358–359).

In Chapter 5, Amadori explores the case of Lope Díez de Améndariz marquis Cadereyta, and viceroy of New Spain, commissioned with the oversight of an ambitious program for the defense of the circum-Caribbean and the transatlantic convoy system from European enemies. The plan was to build up a fleet based on the circum-Caribbean to secure Spanish navigation, yet the funds for such a purpose were hard to get by in the mid-1630s. Cadereyta was put in charge

of the fundraising effort, and upon his arrival in Mexico City engaged in a very visible negotiation with Mexico City's *ayuntamiento* to secure the necessary funds. The aldermen of Mexico City epitomized the *quid pro quo* dynamics by which Spanish Americans expected to have their "services" to the Monarchy compensated with grants and privileges bestowed upon them (438–439). Amadori notes that final Armada de Barlovento project had very little to do with the original design emanated from Madrid. In his chapter of conclusions, Amadori seeks to emphasize the multiple layers of transformations endured by projects from first formulations in Madrid until final implementation—if ever accomplished—in the Americas (444).

Amadori's work reveals many of the paradoxes of Olivares' tenure. The *valido* had intentions of streamlining decision making, yet liberality in patronage, the creation of new offices, and the multiplication of decisive instances made the achievement of "active obedience" rather impossible. Almost as foreshadowing later developments in the relations between Madrid and the Americas, Amadori shows how achieving a consensus of negotiated obedience conspired against the objectives determined in Iberia. Deploying a well-established trope of Hispanic history, the author characterizes the outcome of the *olivarista* program as a "failure" (41, 470). Nonetheless, the book's tone, its constant emphasis on complexity, "diffuse power," and multi-layered decision making actually encourages the reader to challenge pre-established definitions of success, and of failure, customarily instilled in the political historiography of the Hispanic monarchy.